By: The Obnews Editorial Team
India is once again at the centre of Washington’s campaign to squeeze Russia’s energy revenues, but the latest development needs an important distinction.
The United States has not imposed a new 100 percent tariff on India. What happened on September 16, 2026 is that the US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026,
legislation that would give President Donald Trump the authority to impose tariffs of as much as 100 percent on major countries continuing to purchase Russian oil and natural gas. The House approved the measure by 262 votes to 159 after the Senate had already passed it 86 to 11 on August 7. The legislation now goes to Trump for his signature.
Until it is signed and the administration actually invokes the tariff authority, Indian exports are not suddenly subject to a new 100 percent duty. The significance for New Delhi is that Washington would have a powerful new trade instrument available if India continues importing Russian energy at levels the administration considers significant.
The bill is broader than India and is formally aimed at reducing the revenues Russia earns from energy exports during its continuing war with Ukraine. It strengthens sanctions targeting Russian officials, financial institutions, the energy sector and vessels accused by Washington of being part of Russia’s sanctions evasion or so called shadow fleet. The provision most relevant to India allows the US president to impose targeted duties of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian crude oil, the five largest importers of Russian natural gas and major countries accused of facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion.
India is therefore not named because it is India alone. The structure is based on the scale of Russian energy purchases, which also places China and other large buyers within the potential scope of the legislation.
The word “up to” is crucial. The legislation creates tariff authority. It does not require Trump to place a 100 percent tariff on every product from every qualifying country on the day the legislation becomes law. The actual rate, timing, product coverage and use of available exceptions would depend on implementation decisions by the administration.
India responded within hours of the House vote by making energy security the centre of its position. The Ministry of External Affairs said on September 17 that India remains committed to securing energy for its population of approximately 1.4 billion people and that its purchasing decisions will continue to be based on diversified sourcing and changing market conditions.
New Delhi said the issue had already been discussed at senior levels with American officials and that India had explained the possible consequences not only for bilateral relations but for the wider international energy market.
The government also said the Indian side had made clear its determination to take “all necessary measures” to protect the country’s trade and economic interests. The statement suggests that India is preparing for negotiation rather than immediately announcing a major change in its Russian oil policy. Indian officials are monitoring what Trump does next, while the government has indicated that it will work with exporters and industry bodies as the implications become clearer.
That position is easier to understand when the scale of India’s energy requirements is considered. India is one of the world’s largest crude oil importers and Russian barrels have become deeply integrated into its refining system since Western sanctions reshaped global oil flows after 2022. The dependence increased even further during the supply disruptions of 2026.
Reuters reported that Russia accounted for a record 50.83 percent of India’s crude oil imports in July 2026, representing about 2.47 million barrels per day. Across April through July, Russia supplied an average of about 43.25 percent of Indian crude imports, compared with roughly 37 percent during the comparable period a year earlier.
Earlier in June, Russian flows had reached a record of approximately 2.64 million barrels per day as Indian refiners looked for alternatives to disrupted Middle Eastern supplies. In other words, Russian crude is no longer a marginal opportunistic purchase for India. At certain points in 2026 it supplied roughly half of the country’s imported oil.
There is also a major cost calculation behind New Delhi’s position. Russian crude initially became attractive after 2022 because sanctions and reduced European buying forced Moscow to offer its oil into Asian markets at discounts. Those discounts have changed considerably over time, but Russian supply has remained important because India requires enormous quantities of crude every day and its refiners have developed commercial relationships and logistics around those flows.
The Global Trade Research Initiative estimated that India purchased about $40.8 billion worth of Russian crude during the 2025 to 2026 financial year, representing approximately 30.3 percent of the value of India’s crude imports for that year. By the first four months of the current financial year, the value of Russian crude purchases had risen sharply again as supply disruptions elsewhere pushed India toward Russian barrels. This means Washington is effectively asking New Delhi to weigh two large economic exposures against one another: affordable and reliable energy imports on one side and access to the enormous American consumer market on the other.
India has already experienced a smaller version of exactly this confrontation. On August 6, 2025, Trump ordered an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian goods specifically because the United States determined that India was directly or indirectly importing Russian oil.
That duty was imposed on top of other tariffs already affecting Indian goods, causing the combined tariff burden on some products to approach 50 percent. The additional Russia related 25 percent tariff remained in place until February 2026. On February 6, Trump signed an order removing it effective February 7 after the White House said India had taken significant steps to address US concerns.
The administration said at the time that India had committed to stop directly or indirectly importing Russian oil, purchase more American energy and deepen defence cooperation with Washington. The broader reciprocal US tariff on India was also reduced from 25 percent to 18 percent as part of the trade framework announced at that time.
What happened afterwards demonstrates why the current dispute is more complicated than a simple promise to stop buying Russian crude. By the summer of 2026, major disruptions to Middle Eastern energy flows had changed the economics again. India increased Russian purchases dramatically, with Russia eventually supplying more than half of imported crude in July. That creates a difficult reality for policymakers in New Delhi.
An agreement made when alternative barrels were more readily available can become far harder to maintain when shipping routes are disrupted, crude prices rise and several Asian buyers compete for the same alternative supplies. India’s current public position therefore focuses less on any individual supplier and more on the principle that procurement will be determined by national energy requirements, market availability and price. Washington, meanwhile, is attempting to make continued Russian purchases more economically costly by threatening access to the American market.
The American market matters enormously to India. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the United States imported $103.8 billion worth of goods from India in 2025, up 18.9 percent from the previous year. Total US goods trade with India reached approximately $149.1 billion, while combined goods and services trade reached about $239.6 billion. Pharmaceuticals, engineering products, electronics, jewellery, textiles, chemicals and other industries all rely on American demand to varying degrees.
A tariff anywhere close to 100 percent on broad categories of Indian goods would therefore represent a very different scale of trade pressure from the 25 percent Russia related tariff imposed in 2025. It could sharply increase the landed price of Indian products in the United States and weaken their competitiveness against suppliers from countries not facing the same duties. That is precisely why the distinction between a 100 percent tariff being authorized and a 100 percent tariff actually being imposed is so important. At present, the former has happened in Congress. The latter has not.
This is also not the first time India has faced US sanctions pressure, although historically the two countries have generally moved back toward accommodation. Following India’s Pokhran nuclear tests in May 1998, President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions required under the Glenn Amendment, including restrictions on assistance, defence sales, government credit, certain bank lending and controlled technology exports.
Congress subsequently gave the president expanded waiver authority, many restrictions were eased, and President George W. Bush removed the remaining major economic restrictions in September 2001. The episode is useful context because it demonstrates that sanctions have existed within the US India relationship before without permanently defining the relationship. Over the following two decades, Washington and New Delhi instead developed a much larger economic, strategic and defence partnership.
Russia has nevertheless continued to complicate that relationship. India purchased Russia’s S 400 air defence system despite the possibility of sanctions under America’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, known as CAATSA. Washington has not imposed those sanctions on India.
US officials have repeatedly had to balance concerns over Indian purchases of Russian defence equipment against the rapidly expanding US India defence relationship and Washington’s wider Indo Pacific strategy. In 2022, the US House adopted an amendment urging the administration to use available waiver authority for India while strengthening defence cooperation. That treatment was notably different from the sanctions imposed on Turkey following its own acquisition of the Russian S 400. The history shows that Washington has at times chosen strategic flexibility with India even when legislation offered mechanisms for sanctions. That makes presidential discretion under the new Russian energy legislation particularly significant.
At the same time, India has not been completely insulated from targeted US sanctions connected to Russia and Iran. The US Treasury has designated individual India based companies when American authorities alleged that those firms were supplying dual use products, technology or other material to Russian companies connected with the military industrial sector. Treasury actions have also affected India linked businesses accused of helping sanctioned Iranian aviation, petroleum or financial networks.
These measures are important but fundamentally different from a nationwide tariff against Indian exports. They target specific companies, transactions or individuals rather than treating the entire Indian economy as sanctioned. The latest congressional bill is potentially more consequential because it creates a mechanism through which India’s national trade with the United States could be used to pressure decisions about where Indian refiners purchase energy.
China is also central to the debate, but the legislation is not structured as an India only measure. Both China and India are among the world’s dominant purchasers of Russian energy and therefore fall naturally within a rule aimed at the largest importers.
The political sensitivity in India partly comes from the memory of 2025, when Washington imposed the Russia related 25 percent additional tariff specifically on Indian goods while the much broader and more complicated US China trade relationship was handled through separate measures and negotiations. The new legislation creates a broader mechanism that could apply to multiple countries, including China.
Whether similar tariff rates would actually be imposed on different Russian energy buyers is a decision that would come only after the bill becomes law and the Trump administration determines how to use its new authority.
The confrontation therefore goes beyond oil. India and the United States have spent years expanding cooperation in defence, critical technologies, manufacturing, investment and the Indo Pacific, while India continues to describe its foreign policy through the lens of strategic autonomy. That means New Delhi maintains close relations with Washington without accepting that those ties require the abandonment of longstanding relations with Moscow.
Russia remains an important energy and defence partner, while the United States has become one of India’s most important commercial and strategic partners. Those two relationships can coexist when geopolitical conditions are relatively stable. They become much harder to manage when Washington links access to its market directly to India’s economic dealings with Russia.
For India, the immediate question is therefore not whether a 100 percent US tariff has arrived. It has not. The immediate question is how President Trump will use the authority Congress has now placed before him. The legislation still requires his signature, and even after enactment a maximum tariff would not automatically appear on Indian goods.
The administration would have to determine whether to invoke the provision, at what rate, against which products and under what timetable or exceptions. India’s response will depend on those decisions, the availability and price of alternative crude supplies, the volume of Russian oil India continues to purchase and the progress of wider US India trade negotiations.
For now, New Delhi’s message is clear: India intends to keep its energy options open while defending access to one of its most valuable export markets. That balance between American trade pressure and Indian energy security is likely to become one of the most important tests of the US India relationship in the months ahead.