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Indian officials are questioning how much weight New Delhi should place on public declarations of strategic partnership when Washington’s actions often appear driven by a different set of calculations.
Eight years after the United States renamed its Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command in what officials described as recognition of India’s growing strategic importance, Washington has quietly reversed course. The Pentagon’s decision last week to restore the old Pacific Command designation may not alter military deployments or operational responsibilities. Yet within sections of India’s security establishment, the move has been viewed as another reminder that American rhetoric and American priorities do not always move in parallel, with Donald Trump’s second stint in office as President making this all the more obvious.
The concern is not rooted in a single policy decision. Rather, it reflects a growing body of evidence that has accumulated over several years, leading some Indian officials to question how much weight New Delhi should place on public declarations of strategic partnership when Washington’s actions often appear driven by a different set of calculations.
For more than two decades, India and the United States have steadily deepened a partnership that both governments routinely describe as one of the most consequential relationships of the 21st century. Defence agreements have multiplied, military exercises have expanded, intelligence cooperation has grown and successive administrations in Washington have publicly identified India as a central pillar of their Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet within sections of India’s military, intelligence and diplomatic establishment, a more sceptical assessment has been gaining ground.
The first major shock came in April 2021. At a time when bilateral relations were being described as stronger than ever, the US Navy announced that the guided-missile destroyer USS John Paul Jones had conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operation approximately 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep, inside India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. More striking than the operation itself was the accompanying statement. The US Seventh Fleet publicly declared that the transit had been carried out without seeking India’s prior consent and argued that India’s requirement for such consent was inconsistent with international law.
For Indian officials, the issue extended beyond maritime law. Freedom of Navigation Operations are generally associated with challenges to states whose maritime claims Washington opposes. The public nature of the announcement raised an uncomfortable question in New Delhi: if India was one of America’s closest strategic partners, why was it being treated in a manner usually reserved for countries involved in legal disputes with the United States?
“The issue was not the transit itself. The issue was the public messaging. Freedom of Navigation Operations are usually associated with countries whose maritime claims Washington is actively contesting. For many in New Delhi, the question was why a close strategic partner was being treated in the same manner,” a senior Ministry of Defence official said.
If the maritime episode raised questions, the economic relationship deepened them. In 2019, Washington terminated India’s access to the Generalized System of Preferences, a programme under which Indian exports worth approximately US$6.3 billion had enjoyed preferential access to the American market. The estimated value of the duty concessions was roughly US$240 million annually. While the figure was relatively small compared to the size of bilateral trade, Indian policymakers saw the decision as part of a broader pattern. Public declarations describing India as a strategic partner increasingly coexisted with tariff disputes, market-access battles and threats of reciprocal trade measures.
The contradiction became more visible after the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict. India’s decision to continue purchasing Russian crude oil and maintain defence ties with Moscow triggered sustained pressure from Western capitals. American officials repeatedly expressed concern about India’s energy imports and military relationship with Russia. Although Washington ultimately stopped short of imposing sanctions, many Indian officials viewed the pressure campaign as an attempt to limit New Delhi’s strategic autonomy.
“The Russia episode reinforced a longstanding concern in New Delhi. Washington supports strategic autonomy until that autonomy produces outcomes that diverge from American preferences,” a retired diplomat familiar with strategic policymaking said.
Recent tariff threats and trade pressure from the Trump administration, which put India in the category of countries with the highest tariff, have further reinforced concerns among some officials that economic instruments are increasingly being used to advance broader geopolitical objectives. Officials said such developments have contributed to a more cautious assessment of Washington within sections of the strategic community.
The strain is not confined to economics and diplomacy. The Pannun case introduced one of the most sensitive episodes in recent India-US relations. The public indictment alleging involvement of an Indian official and an Indian national in a plot against Khalistani separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun generated significant concern within New Delhi. While India initiated its own inquiry and engaged with Washington, officials privately questioned the manner in which the issue was handled and argued that the case had complicated an already sensitive bilateral relationship.
For some policymakers, however, the most troubling developments emerged at sea. In March 2026, the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena was sunk by a US submarine while transiting waters near Sri Lanka, resulting in the deaths of 104 Iranian sailors. The vessel had only recently participated in the Indian Navy-hosted MILAN exercise and the International Fleet Review at Visakhapatnam, where it had been welcomed alongside naval ships from dozens of countries. The strike was not directed at India. Nevertheless, it resonated within Indian strategic circles because of where it occurred and what it represented. Here was a warship that had just taken part in a major Indian naval event being destroyed by American military action in India’s broader maritime neighbourhood.
“The strike was not directed at India, but it happened in our maritime neighbourhood and involved a ship that had only recently participated in a major Indian naval event. It inevitably raised questions about how much weight Indian sensitivities carry in American operational calculations,” a Ministry of Defence official said.
Three months later, concerns over maritime security acquired a direct human cost. In June, three Indian sailors were killed following a US military strike on the tanker MT Settebello off the coast of Oman. The vessel carried 24 Indian crew members. Twenty-one survived. Chief Engineer Patnala Suresh, Deck Cadet Aditya Sharma and Fitter Shivanand Chaurashiya did not. The United States maintained that the vessel had ignored repeated warnings and was involved in efforts to circumvent restrictions on Iranian oil shipments. India responded by summoning the US chargé d’affaires and lodging a formal diplomatic protest. For many officials, the significance of the episode lay not only in the loss of life but in the reality that Indian citizens had become casualties of an American military operation.
At the same time, another development was attracting increasing attention in New Delhi. For years, Indian policymakers accepted that Washington would maintain relations with Pakistan. What has generated discussion more recently is the visibility and warmth of those engagements. The growing interaction between American officials and Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly the prominence accorded to Field Marshal Asim Munir, has surprised many observers within India’s security establishment.
“No one in India expects the United States to stop engaging Pakistan. The question being asked is whether the growing visibility and warmth of those interactions is consistent with repeated claims that India occupies a uniquely important place in American strategy,” the retired diplomat said. The retired diplomat added that some officials interpreted Washington’s conduct during Operation Sindoor as further evidence that American regional calculations do not always align with Indian expectations.
Taken individually, each of these episodes can be explained through the lens of American national interests. Freedom of Navigation Operations reflect longstanding US maritime doctrine. Trade disputes are common among major economies. Pressure over Russia emerged from the geopolitical fallout of the Ukraine war. The Dena strike was part of a confrontation with Iran. The tanker attack occurred within the context of American efforts to enforce sanctions and maritime restrictions. Engagement with Pakistan serves Washington’s own regional calculations.
Officials do not necessarily dispute any of these explanations. Their argument is different.
“The conclusion many officials are reaching is not that the United States is anti-India. It is that American policy, like the policy of every major power, is ultimately driven by American interests and it will be pursued even if that means endangering or ignoring India’s interests. Those, who don’t accept this, should start believing it,” a senior intelligence officer said.
The resulting reassessment is unlikely to derail India-US relations. But within sections of India’s national security establishment, a harder-edged view appears to be emerging.
“There is a growing recognition that public assurances and strategic realities are not always the same thing. That does not invalidate the partnership, but it does encourage a more hard-headed assessment of its limits,” the senior intelligence officer said.
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