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New Delhi: The warning issued by Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat during his Vijayadashami address in Nagpur on 20 October deserves closer scrutiny, not merely for what he said, but also for the circumstances in which he chose to raise the issue. Bhagwat warned of attempts at regime change in India, citing developments in France, Albania, Nepal and Bangladesh.
His remarks came amid street protests led by the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) and other opposition groups against the Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, during which members associated with the agitation had explicitly called for regime change.
Coming from the head of an organisation widely regarded as the ideological mentor of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the warning raises questions about the concerns informing the RSS leadership’s assessment of developments in India and abroad.
The annual Dussehra address is among the most closely watched public interventions by the RSS leadership. Political observers, policymakers, journalists and international audiences examine the speech for indications of the Sangh’s thinking on the country’s political, social and strategic direction. The RSS chief does not speak at such an event in a political vacuum. His decision to raise the issue of regime change in this setting is significant, particularly because it touches upon national security and the possibility of external interference in India’s internal affairs.
The question is whether Bhagwat’s warning reflects specific intelligence available to the RSS leadership, an assessment based on developments in other countries, a broader concern about the ability of external actors to exploit domestic divisions, or some combination of these. The speech alone does not establish that a covert operation is under way or that Bhagwat received specific intelligence inputs. However, by placing the issue in the public domain, he has made it important for journalists and policy watchers to examine the basis of his concerns.
The sequence of events makes the timing of Bhagwat’s remarks noteworthy. The question is whether he was responding primarily to the language and objectives articulated by those involved in the protests, or whether his warning also reflected a broader assessment of international developments and the possibility of external interference in India. His speech does not establish a connection between the CJP-led agitation and any covert foreign operation. Nevertheless, the proximity of the two developments makes it important to examine both the immediate political context and the wider strategic concerns Bhagwat raised.
The issue is not unfamiliar to this newspaper. Read had earlier reported on concerns about regime-change efforts in Nepal months before the political upheaval that led to the resignation of then Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli in September 2025. In March 2025, the newspaper reported that it had received documents alleging that a plan was being developed to bring about regime change in Nepal. The report raised questions about foreign-funded programmes, political networks and the possible cultivation of local actors.
The subsequent unrest in Nepal gave the earlier reporting renewed significance.
The central question is whether the information and warnings available before the upheaval received adequate attention from Nepal’s political leadership and security establishment. The way events unfolded suggest that it was given a miss by the Nepalese authorities.
Bangladesh presents a similar line of inquiry. Read had reported on efforts to bring about regime change in Bangladesh well before Sheikh Hasina’s government fell in August 2024. The newspaper received information and documents indicating that activities aimed at changing the political landscape had begun several years earlier.
The activities, as described in the documents, predated Hasina’s departure from office by several years. The reporting raised questions about whether activities presented as political engagement, governance support or other forms of institutional assistance could also serve broader strategic objectives.
It is also important to establish what the Bangladeshi government and its security agencies knew about these activities while they were taking place. That is a separate question requiring further investigation.
Taken together, the Nepal and Bangladesh examples make Bhagwat’s warning worthy of closer examination. In both cases, Read had raised concerns about alleged regime-change efforts before the respective political upheavals.
Regime-change operations, covert political influence and interference in the internal affairs of other countries are not new phenomena in international politics. Intelligence agencies and strategic establishments have long studied how states and other actors seek to influence political outcomes abroad. The objectives can include protecting strategic interests, limiting the influence of a rival power, securing access to resources or preventing another country from becoming economically, technologically or militarily stronger.
Such efforts need not take the form of direct intervention. They may involve cultivating political contacts, supporting particular organisations, conducting information campaigns, developing funding networks or attempting to shape public perceptions. Their methods and scale vary from one country to another. In some cases, activities that initially attract little attention acquire greater significance only after a political crisis has unfolded.
This does not mean that every foreign-funded programme is a covert operation or that every protest against an incumbent government is evidence of an externally directed campaign. Foreign assistance, civil society activity, political dissent and public mobilisation can have legitimate purposes. Demonstrations over governance failures, corruption or electoral practices are normal features of democratic life. The existence of public discontent cannot, by itself, establish foreign interference.
The distinction that matters is whether credible evidence establishes coordination, intent and operational support linking external actors to an effort to alter a country’s political direction. That requires more than observing similarities between political events in different countries. It requires examining documents, funding arrangements, communications, organisational links and intelligence assessments, while recognising that domestic grievances and external interests can operate simultaneously.
In India, the current agitation has developed around several political and institutional issues. Protests over examination paper leaks have highlighted concerns about governance and accountability. The SIR exercise has subsequently become a major source of political contention, with opposition parties and activists questioning aspects of the electoral roll revision and demanding accountability from the Election Commission.
The fact that some participants have openly called for regime change is relevant to understanding the immediate political context of Bhagwat’s speech. However, a demand for regime change through democratic means is not, by itself, evidence of a covert operation. The more consequential question is whether the RSS leadership believes that domestic political grievances could be exploited by external actors to advance a broader strategic objective, and what evidence supports such an assessment.
India’s growing economic weight, expanding international relationships, military modernisation and independent foreign policy have increased its importance in global strategic calculations. These developments also place India in competition with other powers across several domains. It is reasonable for the country’s security establishment to assess the possibility that some external actors may seek to constrain India’s rise or influence its political direction.
This is where Bhagwat’s statement assumes significance. It brings together a domestic political debate over regime change and a broader warning about external forces seeking to destabilise countries. Whether he was responding directly to the language used by participants in the CJP-led protests, drawing on the experiences of Nepal and Bangladesh, or expressing a wider strategic assessment remains to be established.
It raises a question that extends beyond the speech itself: whether India’s political and security institutions have sufficient visibility into efforts by external actors to influence domestic political developments, and whether the information available to them is being assessed and acted upon effectively. The answer cannot be derived from the RSS chief’s remarks alone. It must emerge from evidence, investigation and scrutiny of the relevant institutions and activities.
Viewed alongside Read’s earlier reporting on Nepal and Bangladesh, Bhagwat’s warning provides a reason to examine the issue more closely. The timing of his intervention, amid protests in which regime change has become an explicit demand, adds to the significance of the debate. The task now is to establish whether the warning reflects specific information about a threat to India’s political stability, a broader assessment of international developments, or both.