As Prime Minister Narendra Modi marks 25 continuous years in public office, his administration faces a double-edged reality of electoral dominance alongside unprecedented institutional strain, youth-led protests and a diminished personal aura.
Against this backdrop, The Federal spoke to Rahul Verma, Associate Professor at the School of Law, Shiv Nadar University, to make sense of PM Modi’s pragmatic political style, the emergence of the Gen Z-led Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) and the shifting dynamics within the Opposition INDIA alliance.
Edited excerpts:
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi completes 25 continuous years in public office, many observe that despite institutional dominance, he is currently at his weakest moment. Do you agree with this formulation?
I wouldn’t characterise him as simply being at his weakest. He is definitely weak in a narrative sense. For the first time since Modi became prime minister in 2014, a student movement like the CJP demanded the resignation of the education minister over exam leaks, and the BJP had to back down and seek his resignation. That exposes a major hole in the growth-story narrative that the BJP and Modi have projected, as large numbers of young people are on the streets saying the education system offers them no hope.
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Second, there is a gathering storm over institutional weakness, particularly the curtailing of the Election Commission’s autonomy. This is perhaps the first time the Opposition has sustained an accusation that the government is winning elections by rigging them. So, in narrative terms, things look at their weakest.
However, that is not the full picture. The BJP and Modi are also at their strongest electorally. They won states such as Odisha in 2024 and West Bengal in 2026, returned to power in Maharashtra and Haryana, came to power in Delhi for the first time in more than two decades, and consolidated power in Bihar. So electorally, the BJP has been at its peak.
At the same time, Modi is now 75 and ageing. Naturally, his age has become an important factor in public discourse, and people are talking about a post-Modi BJP or a post-Modi India much more than they did in the past.
Since the resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, the Prime Minister is yet to display a counter-strategy against rising protests. Do you think the BJP will return to a collegial style of functioning and collective leadership?
A personality like Modi would not have remained in power for so long if he were not pragmatic and adaptive. Whenever he senses that things are going wrong, he does not mind taking a step back. Taking two steps back and one step forward is a fundamental part of politics, and Modi will do it. Look at late 2023, when the BJP was at its strongest after winning Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. Despite talking about winning 400 seats, Modi went ahead and sealed alliances with Nitish Kumar and Chandrababu Naidu despite their past rivalries. He is a politician who will always find a way around.
Regarding the lack of a counter-strategy since the CJP protests, that itself might be part of his strategy. You do not have to go on the offensive every time. During the severe second wave of COVID-19 in 2021, when people were dying outside hospitals, we did not hear a single statement or tweet from the Prime Minister for an entire month. When you are under attack, going on the counter-offensive can cause you to lose points.
The strategy is to step back, figure out where things went wrong and slowly attempt to correct them. Reaching out through bhajan clubbing or Instagram outreach may not completely undo the damage, but it represents an attempt to find a way out. After 12 years in power, governance failures compound, and any pragmatic politician knows that if you win elections, you can also lose them.
Are we witnessing a weakening of Hindutva and identity politics in favour of bread-and-butter issues, or is this merely a transitory phase?
Both identity politics and bread-and-butter issues have always been part and parcel of Indian politics. In some elections, one dominates; in others, the second takes precedence, but there is a complementarity between them. Social justice politics is part of identity politics, just as Hindutva is. Historically, caste and class overlap in India, so identity politics was never just about representation; it was also about getting a larger share of the economic pie.
The CJP youth protests bringing bread-and-butter issues to the forefront does not mean identity politics will take a back seat. Both will continue simultaneously for the foreseeable future. The BJP has never shied away from its ideological goals. It may become pragmatic at different moments, much like during the Vajpayee era, when coalition constraints forced it to keep core issues at bay until it could return with greater force.
Where do you situate the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) in the historical context of youth and student protests in India?
Every generation experiences a political moment and matures politically during that period. One generation matured during the Emergency; another between 1989 and 1992; my generation matured during the 2009–2012 anti-corruption and Nirbhaya movements; and now we are seeing the political maturing of Gen Z.
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Typically, after 12 to 15 years, the promises made by a previous political movement begin to hollow out. In India, education and competitive exams represent the primary path to upward economic mobility. When young people see that path being rigged and realise their aspirations for decent jobs will not be met, they take to the streets.
The CJP’s mobilisation model is distinct. It started as a satirical meme that no one took seriously, but within three days it garnered 20 million followers. They sat at Jantar Mantar for almost a month, and by early July, everything shifted. Similar youth rebellions have erupted across our neighbourhood in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. While the structural resilience of Indian democracy prevents total collapse, we underestimated both the potential of this movement and the underlying societal resentment.
How do you view the widespread mockery and lampooning of Prime Minister Modi on social media, a medium he originally mastered, playing out over the coming years?
Modi adopted social media early because mainstream media effectively barred him between 2002 and 2009. He did not have an option, so he used new communication technologies to the hilt and became a product of social media.
The CJP protests laid bare the carefully constructed aura surrounding the Prime Minister. His image as an invincible, strong leader, and even claims of being a non-biological being, took a severe hit. Once satire and mockery of a top leader spread widely on social media, reversing that perception becomes extremely difficult, as we previously saw with Rahul Gandhi or Dr Manmohan Singh. Unlike earlier political attacks such as ‘suit-boot don't chain’ or accusations of corporate favours, this wave of satire directly diminished his personal image.
How do you assess the revival of the INDIA alliance around the Election Commission issue, and do you see ground synergy between political parties and movements like the CJP?
Trust in the Election Commission has taken a deep hit following the expose by The Indian Express, which reported that major decisions lacked consensus among the three commissioners. This has put the government on the defensive and given Rahul Gandhi and the Opposition substantial narrative ammunition.
However, the mobilising potential of the Election Commission issue on the ground is far lower than that of cross-cutting issues such as job shortages and exam leaks, which affect families across political lines. We will see synergy among opposition parties in joint meetings, media statements and planned rallies, but ground-level synergy will be limited. In states such as Uttar Pradesh, parties like the Samajwadi Party may be hesitant to make the Election Commission the centre of their local campaigns.
Furthermore, several regional constituents of the INDIA bloc have weakened electorally. The TMC lost ground, AAP and NCP have weakened, and the Left has receded. While their decline creates space for Congress to grow, each player operates with different incentives. The CJP is also cautious about giving space to established opposition parties because it seeks to build its own profile as a fresh political force.
Will allegations of corruption surrounding the Ram Temple figure as a major factor in the upcoming Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections?
Alone, that issue will not determine the outcome of the UP elections, but it is a significant factor. Over the past few months, the BJP’s long-standing projection of having a distinct ‘character, face, thoughts’ (character, face, thought) has been completely exposed. The party has shown itself to be no different from any other political party in power.
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Elements associated with the party are involved in poor governance and corrupt practices. Public perception surveys indicate growing unhappiness over corruption at the local level in UP, ranging from administrative transfers and appointments to local nepotism. Furthermore, there is widespread belief that central institutions such as the ED and CBI are being misused against opposition leaders while tainted leaders joining the BJP are granted immunity. The moral halo of the BJP is gone. While the BJP still possesses vast organisational resources, its claim to moral and ethical politics no longer holds weight with the electorate.